

THE BIHAR VERDICT 2025

AN AUDIT OF THE
"STOLEN MANDATE"



From SIR Manipulation to the
"Midnight Hike" – How the Vote was Engineered

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This report presents a comprehensive ‘Audit’ of the “2025 Bihar Legislative Assembly Elections”, revealing a systemic and structural subversion of the democratic mandate. Based on official data of Election Commission of India (ECI), statutory rules, and on-ground investigation, this document exposes how the verdict was manipulated not just at the ballot box, but months prior to polling through the Special Intensive Revision (SIR).

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Report Authored and Compiled by Vote for Democracy (VFD),
Maharashtra under the guidance of experts¹ of VFD²

The entire effort behind producing the Vote for Democracy’s Report: “THE BIHAR VERDICT 2025: AN AUDIT OF THE "STOLEN MANDATE" [*From SIR Manipulation to the "Midnight Hike" – How the Vote was Engineered*] is to ensure public accountability from our institutions, particularly the constitutional/statutory body the Election Commission of India. Hence, dissemination of this information is appreciated. However, any other use of this report outside public dissemination should be explicitly avoided, especially with regard to judicial proceeding(s), except with the prior consent of the Vote for Democracy.

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² Vote for Democracy (VFD) is a Maharashtra-level citizens’ platform of individuals and organisations formed in 2023 to ensure Voter registration, Voter Awareness, and a Hate-Free Poll where Accountability & Transparency is key. Teesta Setalvad and Dolphy D’Souza are Co-Convenors and for this report a slew of legal researchers and activists contributed to the final product, this Report.

CHAPTER 1

The "Ambush" Revision – SIR in Bihar, Demographic Engineering, and Legal Challenges

1.1 'SIR in Bihar: Demographic Engineering and Legal Challenges'

- The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar, notified by the Election Commission of India on June 24, 2025 through Press Release No. 23/ERS/2025, represented a sharp and unexplained deviation from established statutory practice, initiated merely months ahead of the scheduled Bihar Assembly Elections in November 2025.
- The SIR order was alleged to violate Articles 14, 19, 21, 325 and 326 of the Constitution of India, along with the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and Rule 8, form No. 4 under Rule 8, 21A of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. By doing so, the SIR departed from Section 21(3) the statutorily limited area of revision to a constituency or a part there of, and from limited grounds for deletion of names, namely death, non-residence, or disqualification under Section 16 of the RP Act. Moreover, although Section 21(3) permits a special revision only for “reasons to be recorded,” the SIR notification disclosed no recorded reasons, empirical basis, or transparent methodology to justify such an extraordinary exercise. Further the SIR has been inimical to the rights of the electors as it violates Section 23(4) and 23(6) of the Act where in Aadhaar Number is the only document prescribed for identity.
- This was particularly significant given that Bihar’s electoral rolls had been continuously revised since 2003, including a Special Summary Revision completed in January 2025. Against this backdrop, the timing, scale and manner of the Special Intensive Revision appeared disproportionate and legally untenable and resulted in mass disenfranchisement, as borne out by official figures. Between 24 June and 30 September 2025, the electorate declined from 7.89 crore to 7.24 crore following the removal of nearly 65 lakh names from the draft rolls; of these, only 3.66 lakh were ultimately identified as ineligible, while 21.53 lakh eligible voters were added back, leading to a final roll of approximately 7.42 crore.
- The scale and pattern of these deletions far exceeded confirmed ineligibility and went beyond procedural irregularity. By materially altering the composition of the electorate in the months preceding polling, the SIR functioned as a direct intervention into the organic democratic mandate, reshaping who could participate in the electoral process even before a single vote was cast.
- All this marauding by the ECI through the SIR has been enabled by the complete absence of independent auditing or verification of the exercise and its draft voter rolls. Though the ECI’s own manuals contemplate social audit mechanisms, petitioners’ suggestions for such oversight were ignored. In the absence of transparent, statutory, and participatory scrutiny, the SIR’s sweeping deletions and revisions became an opaque administrative intervention into the composition of the Bihar electorate.
- **SIR a sudden brainwave of the ECI**

Vide No. ECI/PN/206/2025 01.05.2025, ECI advertised new initiatives under which it informed as under:

“The Commission will now obtain death registration data electronically from the Registrar General of India in line with Rule 9 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 and Section 3(5) (b) of the Registration of Births

and Deaths Act, 1969 (as amended in 2023). This will ensure that the Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) receive timely information about registered deaths.’

On June 23, 2025 ECI vide No. ECI/PN/232/2025 23.06.2025 at India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management (IIDEM), New Delhi, in his inaugural address of the training of BLOs Mr. Gyanesh Kumar did not mention SIR at all and underlined the role and need as under:

‘In his inaugural address, CEC Gyanesh Kumar said that these training programmes are essential to ensure that the preparation of electoral rolls and elections are conducted strictly in accordance with the Representation of People Act 1950, 1951, Registration of Electors Rules 1960, Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and the instructions issued by the ECI from time to time’.

- **Chronology of Electoral Roll Fluctuations (SIR Period):**

- June 24, 2025 (Pre-SIR): The ECI reported 7.89 crore electors (7,89,69,844) based on the existing revised electoral roll.
- August 1, 2025 (Draft Roll): Through Press Note ECI/PN/278/2025, the ECI published the draft roll with 7.24 crore electors, reflecting the removal of 65.69 lakh names from the pre-SIR roll.
- September 30, 2025 (Final Roll): Via Press Note ECI/PN/313/2025, the ECI notified the final roll with approximately 7.42 crore electors, after 21.53 lakh electors were added through Form-6 applications and a further 3.66 lakh names were deleted from the draft list.

1.2 The "Ghost" Deletions of July 21-25

- Statistical proof that deletions were algorithmic, not organic.
 - i) Total Deletions (Last 3 Days): 21.27 Lakh voters were removed between July 21–25, 2025.
Between 21 and 25 July 2025, the SIR process in Bihar witnessed a pattern of deletions that was statistically and biologically implausible, indicating an algorithmic purge rather than organic verification. In just these three days, 21.27 lakh voters were removed from the rolls. Of these, an extraordinary 5,44,593 electors were marked as deceased, compared to 16.55 lakh deaths recorded over the previous 27 days, revealing an abrupt and unexplained spike. Simultaneously, 14.24 lakh voters were categorised as “permanently shifted” within the same narrow window.
 - ii) Deceased Category: 5,44,593 deaths recorded in just 3 days, compared to 16.55 Lakh in the previous 27 days.
 - iii) Permanently Shifted: 14.24 Lakh removed in the same 3-day window.
- The anomaly deepened on 22–23 July 2025, when ECI’s own provisional data showed “untraceable electors” rising overnight from 11,484 to nearly 1,00,000—an 809% increase in 24 hours—while total deletions jumped from 52 lakh to 56 lakh, adding 4 lakh deletions in a single day despite marginal gains in enumeration coverage. Critically, although the SIR was publicly justified as a measure to detect and remove “foreigners,” not a single foreign national was identified. The scale, speed and categorisation of these deletions point to systemic data manipulation, establishing that the electorate was mechanically re-engineered through mass, non-organic deletions well before polling commenced.

1.3 The "Rectification" Fraud

- Discrepancy in Objections: ECI claimed only 17,00,000 (16,56,886+ 36,475 = 16,93,361) applications were received by the September 1 deadline. However, actual changes were performed on as many as 22 Lakh entries.
- The Calculation Anomaly:
 - ECI reported additions of 16,56,886 (Form 6) + 36,475 (Claims) and exclusions of 2,17,049³.
 - Net Addition Calculation: Should have been 14,76,312 added to the 7.24 Crore base, totalling 7.38 Crore.
 - Actual Figure (Sept 30): ECI declared 7.42 Crore (No. ECI/PN/313/2025)—a hike of 3.24 Lakh over the calculated figure without explanation.

1.4 Many discrepancies were pointed out by the reports brought out by the Reporters Collective⁴:

- a) SIR is a misnomer. In all earlier revisions the default was that the person on the roll continued and deletion happened only after the ERO/BLO physically verified that the person had died or shifted or migrated so the default was inclusion. In this case the default was to exclude everyone who could not submit the filled form and the required documents. So, in effect this is a new voter roll where the old one is used only as a reference.
- b) The actual pre-filled forms became available much later so the actual time window available to the BLOs to do their work was much smaller than the announced window.
- c) Numerous instances were reported of BLOs filling the forms without actual verification since they were under continuous time pressure.
- d) There were many glitches in the digital infrastructure that was used to upload the data.
- e) The actual instructions kept changing as problems were encountered. For example, forms were allowed to be submitted without documents that could be submitted later.
- f) Checking of duplicate and suspicious entries was not done.

1.5 SIR in Supreme Court: June to December 2025 Timeline

- The outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings has also been far from satisfactory given repeated pleadings by petitioners that the SIR lacked legislative sanction under the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, risked large-scale disenfranchisement, and introduced citizenship-style documentation barriers. The fact that the Court declined to stay the exercise even as proceedings dragged ensured that the ECI's actions escaped thorough judicial scrutiny.
- Multiple petitions were filed before the Supreme Court in July 2025. The Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), RJD MP Manoj Jha, TMC MP Mahua Moitra, and Social Activist Yogendra Yadav among several others have filed petitions before the apex court, alleging that the SIR lacked statutory backing under the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, imposed onerous documentation requirements, and risked large-scale disenfranchisement, particularly of migrants, the poor and marginalised communities. Petitioners argued that the SIR effectively resembled a citizenship-style verification exercise

³ <https://www.eci.gov.in/eci-backend/public/api/download?url=LMAhAK6sOPBp%2FNFF0iRfXbEB1EVSLT41NNLRjYNJJIP1KivrUxbfqkDatmHy12e%2FzIC5IR1A3V88Anuk8RlyPGe5wAx9KElz%2FMmtZbUSdw6MA1FNC3hFn7gaiQZffHeEbgTKfKteB91VEcg4IKygWdA%3D%3D>

⁴ <https://www.reporters-collective.in/newsletters/bihars-messy-sir-saga-continues>

without legislative sanction, violated Article 326, and placed unrealistic timelines and coercive pressure on Booth Level Officers (BLOs).

- On July 28, 2025, the Supreme Court declined to stay publication of the Bihar draft electoral roll, observing that it would closely monitor the process and intervene if even a small number of living, eligible voters were wrongly excluded; the Court stressed that SIR must aim at “*en-masse inclusion, not en-masse exclusion.*”
- As SIR notifications expanded to Tamil Nadu and West Bengal in September 2025, fresh petitions were listed on 11 November 2025, where the Court sought detailed replies from the ECI on safeguards, grievance redressal, and law-and-order issues, including deployment of CAPF. The Apex Court continued to keep the matter pending for further monitoring and state-wise scrutiny.

CHAPTER 2

Pre-Bihar Assembly Election & SIR Timing The Alleged Structural Rigging

2.1 The Post-Notification Surge

- Shifting the Goal-post after Blowing the Whistle: Hiking of elector numbers after the election notification violated the fundamentals of the roll's sanctity (where numbers are frozen at the point of announcement/launch.
- The Data:
 - Notification (Oct 6, 2025): 7,43,55,976 Electors. (7,41,92,357 + 1,63,619)
 - Poll Day (Nov 11, 2025): 7,45,26,858 Electors that do not include service electors and with the inclusion of 1,63,619 service electors the number of electors becomes 7,46,90,477 (via Press Note [ECI/PN/351/2025](#)).
 - The Difference: 3,34,501 voters added in just 10 days' post-notification
 - The CEO Bihar 06.10.2025 issued press statement and claimed 18-19 electors to be 14,01,150 (1.89%).
 - 20-29 age group electors 1,63,25,614
 - The date for registration is only age as on 30.09.2025 even after amended law.
 - The advance applications in age group 18-19 for registration of those who would become eligible on 1.10.2025 was nil.
 - On 06.10.2025 CEO claimed that the advance application for eligible to be registered as on 1.10.2025 were only for 66817 electors in 20-29 age group ⁵
 - However, on 30.10.2025 ⁶ in the Fact sheet of Bihar Assembly issued for both the phases given in press release contained 80,18,614+84,64,641 = 1,64,83,255
 - Youth Vote Spike: The 18-19 age group jumped from 14.01 Lakh to 15.07 Lakh instantly.
- As per Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar's Press release dated 06.10.2025, following are new additions:

➤ No. of those who became First time voters (18-19 age)	14,01,150
➤ Women Electors added in SIR	10,30,577
➤ Pending applications for new electors age (20-29) as on 1.10.2025	66,817
➤ Total New Addition	24,98,544

- **Figures Relating to New EPIC Issuance**

As per the data placed on record, the issuance of new EPIC (Elector Photo Identity Card) numbers to newly enrolled voters have been shown in two phases up to 30.10.2025:

Phase I: New EPIC numbers issued – **10,72,668**

⁵ https://ceoelection.bihar.gov.in/PDF/Year_2025/PressRelease2025/OCT/06-10-2025%20Press%20Note%20MCC.pdf

⁶ https://ceoelection.bihar.gov.in/PDF/Year_2025/PressRelease2025/OCT/30-10-2025%20Fact_at_a_Glance-2nd%20Phase.pdf

Phase II: New EPIC numbers issued – 10,21,812

If both phases are taken together, the total number of new EPICs issued to new electors should logically and arithmetically come to - $10,72,668 + 10,21,812 = 20,94,480$

- This total has indeed been shown as 20,94,480. However, while the arithmetic may appear correct on the surface, serious concerns arise when these figures are examined in the broader context of electoral roll revision, deletions, additions, timelines, and disclosures made at different stages. The manner in which these numbers have been released, split across phases, and communicated lacks transparency, consistency, and explanatory clarity.

- **Why these figures raise serious concerns**

The figures, instead of providing clarity, raise more questions than they answer. There is no clear public explanation of:

- *How many applications were received in each phase,*
- *How many were rejected,*
- *How many were pending,*
- *Whether any duplication checks were conducted between Phase I and Phase II,*
- *Whether the same electorate universe was altered simultaneously through deletions and additions.*
- This non-tallying without full disclosure framework, marked by fragmented and phased figures without methodological explanation, speaks volumes about arbitrariness. At best, it reflects administrative bungling and casual handling of a constitutionally sensitive exercise. At worst, it gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of intentional actions designed to create confusion, obscure scrutiny, and manipulate outcomes by overwhelming the process with unexplained numerical shifts.

- **Why this is being described as ‘Alleged Pre-Poll Rigging’**

The concern does not stop at numbers alone. It is compounded by the manner in which constitutional provisions are being interpreted and applied. Articles 324, 325, and 326 of the Constitution of India collectively entrust the Election Commission with:

- *Superintendence, direction, and control of elections,*
- *Ensuring non-discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth,*
- *Guaranteeing universal adult suffrage.*
- *However, these Articles do not grant unfettered or legislative power to the Election Commission. They operate within a constitutional framework that mandates legislative supremacy.*

- **Articles 327 and 328** clearly lay down that:

The power to make law governing elections vests only in Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be. The Election Commission, being an executive authority, is bound to act strictly in accordance with laws framed by the Legislature. Thus, Articles 327 and 328 are the controlling provisions, as they determine who has the authority to lay down principal and subordinate legislation. The Election Commission has no power to legislate, alter substantive norms, or introduce new eligibility or verification standards on its own.

Its role is limited to streamlining procedures to implement existing law in letter and spirit, not to reinterpret or override it.

- **Constitutional breach through executive overreach**

When unexplained numerical expansions, phased disclosures, and procedural innovations are introduced without clear legislative backing, it amounts to executive overreach. Such actions, especially when undertaken immediately before elections, strike at the root of electoral fairness and create a reasonable apprehension that the process is being manipulated even before polling begins. It is for these reasons—opaque figures, arbitrary disclosures, absence of statutory grounding, and subversion of constitutional limits on executive power—that the present exercise is being characterised as alleged pre-poll rigging, warranting strict scrutiny, judicial oversight, and full public disclosure.

2.2 Structural Rigging: Schedule and Booths

- The "Ghost Booth" Strategy:
 - LS 2024: ~7.73 Crore voters served by 77,462 booths.
 - Bihar 2025: 7.43 Crore voters (30 Lakh *less*) served by 90,740 booths (13,000 *more*)
 - Strategic Placement: The increase of 13,000 booths occurred only in accessible areas, with NONE added in remote areas across water bodies where BJP/RSS presence is weak.
- Pre-Fixing Schedule: Unscientific division of constituencies (1/1 and 1/2) and violation of contiguity allowed "Star Campaigners" to campaign in neighbouring constituencies while voting was ongoing.

2.3 ECI keeps changing the manner and format in which data is released

- For the last elections of Lok Sabha elections in 2019 & then in 2024 the ECI instead of coming clean has started;
 - Playing with the figures,
 - Concealing information,
 - Changing the parameters of information
 - Refusing to place data in the public domain in a scientific manner,
 - In name of improvements it has introduced parties with possible conflict of interest in the electoral process e.g. introduction of JEEVIKA DIDIS as poll volunteers.
 - ECI has stopped giving constituency wise electors and voters
 - Has stopped giving the constituency wise poll percentages
 - Has stopped giving final figures of votes polled in each constituency or state as a whole before counting
- In Bihar it has given poll percentage only district wise whereas voting is constituency wise and district has nothing to do with the Assembly Elections. Even district wise voter turnout percentages have been given by the CEO Bihar only till 5.00 PM for first as well as Second phase. The final figure of votes polled even district wise have not been divulged.
- So much so even the total votes polled in the EVMs in the state as a whole have been kept a highly guarded secret.
- This is the basis of our observations. Further, when the analysis of half-baked figures given in an unscientific manner, show huge discrepancies between the figures given by various sources including CEO Bihar and the ECI, and in the statistical reports published by the

ECI, we have no option but to draw inferences that imply that our democracy has serious deficits of transparency and accountability.

2.4 The Agency Gap: BLAs and Jeevika Didis

- Institutional Capture: The deployment of 1.8 Lakh "Jeevika Didis" weaponised the process and undermined BLO authority.

The state's welfare apparatus—specifically the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society (BRLPS), which manages millions of rural women in Self-Help Groups (SHGs) who are popularly known as 'Jeevika Didis'—was co-opted for political benefit, thereby compromising the neutrality of the electoral system.

Term used by ECI in its press note No. ECI/PN/351/2025 11.11.2025⁷ is 'JEEVIKA Didi'.

The term "JEEVIKA" does not represent an acronym or expanded form in law or official usage; rather, it is the programme name under which the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society (BRLPS) operates, reflecting its stated objectives

The "institutional capture" stems from two key actions, particularly in the run-up to elections:

1. **Targeted Financial Inducement:** The government transferred substantial direct cash assistance (such as a Rs 10,000 grant) to a massive segment of these women (over 1.2 crore beneficiaries) right before the polls. The opposition criticised this timing, describing it as a "brazen act of bribery" and a "cash-for-vote" scheme, effectively turning a social welfare scheme into a mechanism for securing women's vote .

2. **Deployment as Quasi-Election Officials:** The subsequent official deployment of approximately 1.80 lakh Jeevika Didis on poll duty as volunteers alongside regular staff was viewed as "weaponising the process." These deployed women were beneficiaries of the ruling party's financial policies, making them politically invested.

3. **Undermining BLO Authority:** The core issue is the alleged compromise of the election process at the grassroots level. Booth Level Officers (BLOs) are traditionally non-partisan government employees (teachers, clerks) responsible for maintaining electoral rolls and managing polling stations. The large-scale placement of politically sensitive beneficiaries on official election duty was seen as blurring the lines of neutrality, potentially introducing partisan influence directly into the polling process and thereby eroding the non-aligned authority of the regular BLOs.

- Booth Level Agents (BLAs) Bias:
 - NDA BLAs: 91,098 (BJP: 53,338 + JDU: 36,550 + LJP: 1,210)
 - MGB BLAs: 67,450 (RJD: 17,549 + INC: 47,506 + Others)

⁷ <https://www.eci.gov.in/eci-backend/public/api/download?url=LMAhAK6sOPBp%2FNFF0iRFXbEB1EVSLT41NNLRjYNJJP1KivrUxbfqkDatmHy12e%2FzOS%2BIOmr%2FtOeSK8w38bI0zVpeBXSsnQZZ9%2F7T4x79iAYgwptL.94F3IBQZtuq2zGmP%2FBjwjjXqBpDi0z8dEQAXuw%3D%3>

- Total Agents: 1,40,274 i.e. Only 1.55 agents per booth average, creating huge scope for unmonitored bungling)
- Systemic Issue: The SC has allowed BLAs to be involved in voter registration, creating an inherent bias) - How does the neutrality of this process be safeguarded when responsibility of a task essentially to be conducted by a constitutional body like the ECI is shifted? When Booth Level Agents—who are politically affiliated—are permitted to participate in voter registration and verification?

CHAPTER 3

Post-Election and Result Analysis: Polling Violations & Data Fudging

3.1 Polling Day Violations: The "Martyring of Democracy"

- Operational Failures: Reports of CCTV not working, VVPATs scattered on the ground, trucks outside strong rooms, and unauthorized persons present.
- Transport: Reports of 6,000 voters sent by special trains in a single day.

In the lead-up to the Bihar Assembly elections of 2025, multiple operational irregularities were reported that collectively cast a shadow over the electoral process. Right to Information (RTI) responses revealed the operation of four unannounced “special trains” departing from Karnal and Gurugram in Haryana to Bhagalpur and Barauni, Bihar, on November 3, 2025, just days before polling on November 6 and 11, facilitating the transport of an estimated 6,000 Voters/Agents in a single day.

The trains were heavily composed of General Seating (GS) coaches capable of carrying thousands, yet authorities refused to disclose fare payments, passenger numbers, or the party/person responsible, citing vague “Rush Clearance” explanations.

On November 9, 2025, MP Kapil Sibal questioned why only Haryana was prioritised, highlighting a critical anomaly since migrant workers return to Bihar from multiple states. RJD MP A.D. Singh alleged these trains carried “professional voters” with potentially fake EPIC cards, claiming coordination between BJP officials and railway authorities. During polling, operational failures were also reported at multiple stations, including CCTV cameras not functioning, VVPATs scattered on the ground, trucks left outside strong rooms, and unauthorized persons present in sensitive areas.

The Railway Ministry defended the special trains as festival-related travel during Chhath and Diwali, citing over 12,000 special trains—including 2,000 unscheduled—to handle passenger rush, but video evidence from SNA News and Swarnpatr showed passengers admitting that tickets were provided free by the BJP, with party functionaries confirming the arrangement aimed to ensure voter participation. Legally, if the trains were funded for electoral purposes, it could constitute a “corrupt practice” under Section 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and a violation of the Model Code of Conduct, which prohibits the misuse of government machinery for political advantage. Despite these revelations, the Election Commission has reportedly remained silent, raising serious concerns over regulatory oversight, election integrity, and the alleged “martyring of democracy” in Bihar 2025.

3.2 The "Midnight Hike" Formula (0.18%)

- Statistical Absurdity: On Nov 12, ECI hiked *both* Male and Female turnout by exactly 0.18%
- Calculated Fudging: This formula added 1,34,145 votes, gifting NDA approximately 20 extra seats.
- Data Flipping Pattern:
 - Phase 1: Recorded by CEO Bihar 64.46%, ECI 64.66% -> Hiked to 65.08% (Nov 11)
 - Phase 2: From 1st phase Recorded at 64.66% -> Hiked to 68.76% (a massive 4.10% jump)

3.3 The Horizontal vs. Vertical Mismatch

- Forensic Audit: Totals do not tally.
 - Phase 1: ECI Total (3,75,13,302) minus Gender Sum (3,75,12,544) = 758 vote mismatch.
 - Phase 2: 943 vote mismatch
 - Impact: These "phantom votes" flipped seats with margins as low as 27 votes (Sandesh) and 95 votes (Agiaon).

3.4 Razor-Thin Contests: Results in 21 of 30 Seats show narrow margin victories of 0–15 Votes

In 20 constituencies, the total votes secured by winners were nearly identical, with differences ranging from 0 to 9 votes.

The "Thin Margin" Rule (Rule 56D)

There is no rule that automatically triggers a 100% VVPAT count due to a close contest. Instead, the candidate must apply for it, and the Returning Officer (RO) has the discretion to accept or reject it.

- Provision: Rule 56D of the *Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961*.
- How it works:
 1. After the EVM entries are counted, a candidate or their agent can apply in writing to the RO to count the printed VVPAT paper slips.
 2. The application must state the grounds (reasons) for demanding the count.
 3. **RO's Discretion:** The RO can decide to count the VVPAT slips or reject the request if it appears "frivolous or unreasonable."
 4. **Requirement:** If the RO rejects the request, they must record the reasons in writing.

Among these, 14 seats were won by BJP, 5 by JDU, and one by LJP. The table shows pairs such as Kurhani (BJP, 1,07,811) and Rajgir (JDU, 1,07,811) with exactly equal votes, Kumhrar (BJP, 1,00,485) and Islampur (JDU, 1,00,487) differing by only 2 votes, and similar minimal differences in multiple other constituencies. This concentration of razor-thin difference of votes obtained in victories, demonstrates a striking dominance of BJP in low-margin constituencies even among NDA allies, raising questions about the uniformity of vote distribution and the factors behind such extraordinary closeness.

Table 1

Showing almost equal votes on 20 seats with a difference of 0 to 9 votes only

S. No.	AC Name	Winner	Total Votes	AC No.	AC Name	Winner	Total Votes	Diff.
1	KURHANI	BJP	107811		RAJGIR	JDU	107811	0
2	KUMHRAR	BJP	100485		ISLAMPUR	JDU	100487	2
3	SHAHPUR	BJP	88655		BARAULI	JDU	88657	2
4	CHHATAPUR	BJP	122491		BANMANKH I	BJP	122494	3
5	TARARI	BJP	96887		GOPALGANJ	BJP	96892	5
6	RUNNISAIDPUR	JDU	93672		PHULPARAS	JDU	93677	5
7	PATEPUR	BJP	108356		RAJNAGAR	BJP	108362	6
8	MUZAFFARPUR	BJP	100477		KUMHRAR	BJP	100485	8
9	BARURAJ	BJP	96879		TARARI	BJP	96887	8
10	CHENARI	LJP	95579		BANKA	BJP	95588	9

Further analysis of 10 additional seats reveals differences of only 10 to 15 votes, continuing the trend of unusually tight outcomes. For instance, Chhatarpur and Tarari, both won by BJP, differed by merely 11 votes (1,22,491 vs. 1,22,480), while Alinagar and Buxar, also BJP victories, differed by just 14 votes (84,915 vs. 84,901). Vaishali (JDU) and Rajnagar (BJP) differed by 15 votes (1,08,377 vs. 1,08,362), and Baruraj and Harsidhi (both BJP) differed by 15 votes (96,879 vs. 96,864). Alauli and Nokha (both JDU) also show a 15-vote difference (93,208 vs. 93,193). Out of these 10 seats, 7 were won by BJP and 3 by JDU, indicating a continuing tilt in narrow-margin victories toward BJP candidates.

Combining the two sets, out of 30 seats with near-identical vote totals, BJP has won 21, JDU 8, and LJP 1. The data exposes a highly unusual electoral landscape, where razor-thin vote margins overwhelmingly favour one party, suggesting an underlying pattern that warrants scrutiny.

3.5 Results Analysis: EVM vs. Postal Ballot Anomaly

- **NDA lost 109 seats in Postal Ballot**
- **MGB lost 6 seats in Postal Ballot**
- **5 other seats lost in Postal Ballot**

Upon examination of seat-wise outcomes reveals a striking divergence between results secured through Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and Postal Ballots (PB). Out of a total of 243 Assembly seats, in as many as 120 constituencies the eventual winner lost the postal ballot count, show a significant mismatch between the two.

From the below table it is palpably clear that out of 243 total seats in 120 seats the candidate /Alliance that won the seat has lost in Postal ballots:

Table 2
Postal Ballots (PB) Loser but Winner Otherwise in EVM

Sl. No.	Name of Party	Seats Won	Lost in Postal Ballots (PB)	% Seats Lost in PB
	NDA	202	109	53.96%
1.	Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP)	89	54	60.67%
2.	Janta Dal (United) (JDU)	85	35	41.18%
3.	Lok Jan Shakti Party (Ram Vilas) LJP RV	19	12	63.16%
4.	Hindustani Awam Morcha	5	4	80%
5.	Rashtriya Lok Morcha	4	4	100%
	Mahagathbandhan (MGB)	35	6	17.14%
1.	Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD)	25	6	24%
2.	Indian National Congress (INC)	6	0	0%
3.	Communist Party of India (Marxist- Leninist) Liberation (CPIML) Lib	2	0	0%
4.	Communist Party of India (Marxist) Cpi(M)	1	0	0%
5.	Indian Inclusive Party (IIP)	1	0	
	Others Alliances /Otherwise			
1.	All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM)	5	4	80%
2.	Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)	1	1	100%
	Grand Total	243	120	

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) dominates this anomaly. Of the 120 seats where winners lost in postal ballots, the NDA alone accounts for 109 seats—an overwhelming 90.83%. Within the NDA, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) shows the sharpest contrast, losing postal ballots in 54 of the 89 seats it won. Janata Dal (United) lost postal ballots in 35 of its 85 winning seats, while Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) lost in 12 of 19. Smaller NDA allies such as Hindustani Awam Morcha and Rashtriya Lok Morcha display even higher proportions.

In contrast, the Mahagathbandhan (MGB) presents a markedly different picture. Of its 35 winning seats, only six saw losses in postal ballots—just 5% of the total 120 such seats. The Congress, CPI(ML) Liberation, CPI(M) and IIP won all their seats consistently in both EVM and postal ballots.

Overall, the broad alignment of voter preference in postal ballots against the NDA, juxtaposed with its decisive EVM victories, highlights that the NDA's electoral success rests predominantly on EVM outcomes rather than postal ballot support.

3.6 BJP Dominance and Party Performance

- The election data from 128 Assembly Constituencies (ACs) highlights clear patterns in party performance and voting dynamics. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged as the

dominant force, winning 60 out of 128 ACs (approximately 47%), reflecting a strong and widespread electoral presence. The Janata Dal (United) (JDU) followed closely with 46 victories (around 36%), while the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) managed 16 wins. Smaller parties such as HAM, RLM, and RJD captured only a handful of seats, underscoring the concentrated influence of the major parties in this electoral cycle.

Table 3
Deletions More Than Winning Margin

S. No.	AC Name	Winner	EVM Votes	PB	Total	%age Votes	Margin	Deleted	Loser PB	Diff PB
1	Lalganj	BJP	127193	457	127650	53.14	32167	33,303	676	-219
2	Purnia	BJP	127340	274	127614	54.79	33222	49,427	272	2
3	Phulwari	JDU	126194	276	126470	49.18	32657	35,407	168	108
4	Korha	BJP	123375	120	123495	51.82	22257	25,849	186	-66
5	Chhatapur	BJP	122145	346	122491	49.18	16178	30,143	581	-235
6	Lakhisarai	BJP	122009	399	122408	49.2	24940	25,860	358	41
7	Narpatganj	BJP	120366	191	120557	49.89	25353	31,180	212	-21
8	Begusarai	BJP	119135	371	119506		30632	38,758	529	-158
9	Nathnagar	LJP	117976	167	118143	48.92	25424	37,453	185	-18
10	Kanti	JDU	116893	406	117299	50.43	25795	28,312	368	38
11	Hajipur	BJP	112565	656	113221	50.27	18509	38,085	855	-199
12	Laukaha	JDU	111415	346	111761	48.43	25511	36,967	664	-318
13	Sikti	BJP	111182	160	111342	50.56	19322	19,500	212	-52
14	Pipra	BJP	110119	303	110422	45.13	10,745	35,065	548	-245
15	Simri Bakhtiarpur	LJP	109403	296	109699	46.94	7930	33,912	512	-216
16	Supaul	JDU	108562	523	109085	52.16	30803	31,259	535	-12
17	Sultanganj	JDU	108523	189	108712	51.81	31136	44,630	174	15
18	Pranpur	BJP	108453	112	108565	42.65	7752	25,811	238	-126
19	Rajnagar	BJP	107983	379	108362	56.79	42185	46,242	399	-20
20	Patepur	BJP	107977	379	108356	51.71	22380	26,610	501	-122
21	Jhajha	JDU	108158	159	108317	44.42	4262	19,025	121	38
22	Barachatti	HAM	108059	212	108271	47.44	8893	26,115	331	-119
23	Bochahan	LJP	107892	294	108186	49.43	20316	23,428	362	-68
24	Gaighat	JDU	107845	259	108104	48.31	23417	28,393	321	-62
25	Munger	BJP	107723	305	108028	51.12	18750	24,435	379	-74
26	Barari	JDU	107689	153	107842	47.18	10984	22,530	362	-209
27	Kurhani	BJP	107493	318	107811	46.49	9718	24,336	408	-90
28	Rafiganj	JDU	107120	395	107515	47.95	11956	28,380	361	34
29	Baaha	BJP	106638	237	106875	47.39	6313	23,631	397	-160
30	Raxaul	BJP	106498	267	106765	49.55	17878	21,764	505	-238
31	Masaurhi	JDU	106293	212	106505	47.16	7643	36,987	211	1
32	Singheshwar	JDU	106345	71	106416	46.43	2982	21,033	120	-49
33	Sahebganj	BJP	106077	245	106322	48.43	13522	28,474	327	-82
34	Motihari	BJP	105645	435	106080	49.5	13563	54,013	642	-207
35	Goriakothi	BJP	105799	110	105909	49.64	12385	31,060	93	17
36	Triveniganj	JDU	104912	350	105262	47.48	5683	22,248	604	-254
37	Sasaram	RLM	104701	305	105006	47.49	25443	27,143	517	-212

38	Imamganj	HAM	104650	211	104861	50.83	25856	27,817	247	-36
39	Narkatia	JDU	104104	346	104450	46.7	1443	23,431	578	-232
40	Sitamarhi	BJP	103952	274	104226	48.11	5562	28,420	421	-147
41	Sursand	JDU	103962	195	104157	50.04	23667	30,756	245	-50
42	Baikunthpur	BJP	103801	332	104133	49.05	16953	45,770	590	-258
43	Sarairanjan	JDU	102465	327	102792	49.37	20798	21,187	265	62
44	Bhorey	JDU	100856	613	101469	47.61	16163	44,691	470	143
45	Kuchaikote	JDU	100926	499	101425	50.21	24491	59,963	373	126
46	Bikram	BJP	100864	325	101189	47.02	5601	24,208	278	47
47	Khajauli	BJP	100866	285	101151	49.36	13126	34,794	541	-256
48	Bhagalpur	BJP	100519	251	100770	51.11	13474	30,229	238	13
49	Jale	BJP	100289	207	100496	50.16	21862	27,182	271	-64
50	Bachhwara	BJP	100049	294	100343	45.03	15841	21,173	431	-137
51	Katihar	BJP	100005	250	100255	50.52	22154	22,861	272	-22
52	Kadwa	JDU	99182	92	99274	46.57	18368	30,298	207	-115
53	Bajpatti	RLM	99034	110	99144	45.02	3395	30,035	261	-151
54	Sakra	JDU	98485	238	98723	47.9	15050	17,908	270	-32
55	Bakhri	LJP	98368	143	98511	47.67	17318	18,280	356	-213
56	Babubarhi	JDU	97947	274	98221	47.61	17568	34,090	679	-405
57	Madhubani	RLM	97743	213	97956	46.38	20552	37,276	429	-216
58	Sonbarsha	JDU	97606	227	97833	47.39	13454	35,060	345	-118
59	Gopalganj	BJP	96353	539	96892	48.72	28972	66,270	374	165
60	Tarari	BJP	96310	577	96887	49.59	11464	31,428	512	65
61	Harsidhi	BJP	96590	274	96864	47.74	7095	17,660	553	-279
62	Bahadurpur	JDU	95949	351	96300	45.24	12011	29,300	408	-57
63	Hilsa	JDU	95521	488	96009	49.73	16012	24,388	295	193
64	Hisua	BJP	95490	395	95885	44.4	27849	37,733	347	48
65	Samastipur	JDU	95476	252	95728	48.14	13875	27,876	323	-71
66	Belaganj	JDU	95218	467	95685	46.67	2882	27,376	458	9
67	Baniapur	BJP	95343	263	95606	47.7	15436	28,350	316	-53
68	Banka	BJP	95413	175	95588	49.58	23764	24,478	183	-8
69	Chenari	LJP	95310	269	95579	46.44	21988	25,619	409	-140
70	Wazirganj	BJP	94184	390	94574	44.99	12733	27,567	482	-92
71	Katoria	BJP	94070	190	94260	48.07	10986	19,503	295	-105
72	Arrah	BJP	93598	603	94201	50.98	19581	28,942	496	107
73	Phulparas	JDU	93376	301	93677	45.65	14099	38,160	529	-228
74	Runnisaidpur	JDU	93580	92	93672	48.5	19737	27,992	92	0
75	Barharia	JDU	93481	119	93600	47.51	12136	27,864	124	-5
76	Jagdishpur	JDU	92462	512	92974	49.39	18193	28,314	404	108
77	Siwan	BJP	92233	146	92379	48.47	9370	23,633	162	-16
78	Hathua	JDU	91842	279	92121	46.99	12348	45,446	323	-44
79	Obra	LJP	91177	461	91638	44.83	12013	29,349	600	-139
80	Sikandra	HAM	91480	123	91603	47.16	23907	24,089	119	4
81	Hasanpur	JDU	90810	151	90961	44.43	7914	30,411	208	-57
82	Sonepur	BJP	90591	251	90842	45.59	4767	18,052	214	37
83	Rajauli	LJP	90097	175	90272	44.98	3953	20,716	413	-238
84	Mohiuddinnagar	BJP	88994	214	89208	48.68	11682	26,244	247	-33
85	Keoti	BJP	88908	215	89123	46.28	7305	22,893	348	-133

86	Kalyanpur	BJP	88759	298	89057	47.82	15568	22,677	459	-161
87	Barauli	JDU	88339	318	88657	45.66	12374	46,990	366	-48
88	Shahpur	BJP	87897	758	88655	49.69	15225	31,530	485	273
89	Bakhtiarpur	LJP	88329	191	88520	45.14	981	17,719	166	25
90	Aurangabad	BJP	86837	363	87200	43.38	6794	30,338	645	-282
91	Benipatti	BJP	86932	221	87153	49.74	23932	31,934	287	-66
92	Daraunda	BJP	86880	167	87047	47.02	18367	28,872	128	39
93	Kasba	LJP	86819	58	86877	36.81	12875	35,236	146	-88
94	Chapra	BJP	86561	284	86845	45.86	7600	25,674	348	-64
95	Maharajganj	JDU	86674	139	86813	46.22	21099	28,207	110	29
96	Madhuban	BJP	85683	319	86002	46.78	5492	22,773	485	-166
97	Taraiya	BJP	85401	163	85564	44.21	1329	32,095	165	-2
98	Thakurganj	JDU	84958	285	85243	34.71	8822	29,566	102	183
99	Alinagar	BJP	84611	304	84915	49.05	11730	14,426	546	-242
100	Kutumba	HAM	84465	262	84727	48.79	21525	24,130	280	-18
101	Benipur	JDU	83781	426	84207	44.7	13603	18,102	399	27
102	Ekma	JDU	83844	233	84077	49.16	22708	28,595	208	25
103	Darauli	LJP	82804	210	83014	47.38	9572	32,931	158	52
104	Parihar	BJP	82559	85	82644	39.36	17189	30,011	184	-99
105	Belsand	LJP	81975	101	82076	44.83	22685	38,968	193	-92
106	Ghosi	JDU	80203	537	80740	47.05	11929	18,236	403	134
107	Rajpur	JDU	80368	333	80701	38.19	9136	16,590	352	-19
108	Darbhanga Rural	JDU	80355	269	80624	44.05	18392	26,291	330	-61
109	Sandesh	JDU	80072	526	80598	43.99	27	25,062	463	63
110	Balrampur	LJP	80349	110	80459	29.04	389	29,254	72	38
111	Nabinagar	JDU	80115	265	80380	42.29	112	24,530	291	-26
112	Arwal	BJP	79400	454	79854	46.66	14093	15,312	514	-60
113	Barhara	BJP	78980	613	79593	43.71	14403	26,237	439	174
114	Dumraon	JDU	78884	527	79411	40.37	2105	21733	637	-110
115	Dinara	RJD	78151	187	78338	41.88	10834	17,797	279	-92
116	Kesaria	JDU	77879	313	78192	44.26	16340	25,214	261	52
117	Gaura Bauram	BJP	77446	236	77682	46.18	5669	18,906	367	-131
118	Sherghati	LJP	77118	152	77270	38.13	13524	20,236	278	-126
119	Hayaghat	BJP	76915	307	77222	45.68	11839	13,621	432	-125
120	Mohania	BJP	75998	292	76290	39.98	18752	18,913	287	5
121	Amnour	BJP	75298	227	75525	44.52	3808	37,200	242	-15
122	Kurtha	JDU	74089	377	74466	44.9	5481	25,545	408	-31
123	Gobindpur	LJP	72360	221	72581	40.12	22906	25,545	214	7
124	Cheria - Bariarpur	JDU	70682	280	70962	37.09	4119	15,354	280	0
125	Chainpur	JDU	70597	279	70876	30.94	8362	20,988	337	-58
126	Agiaon	BJP	69039	373	69412	45.2	95	20,316	425	-52
127	Manjhi	JDU	68116	339	68455	38.53	9787	29,432	263	76
128	Ziradei	JDU	66137	90	66227	41.94	2626	19,104	103	-13

- **Close Contests and Narrow Margins:** A notable feature of the results is the prevalence of extremely tight contests. Many constituencies were decided by narrow margins, where even minor shifts in postal ballots (PB) could have been decisive. For instance, in Barachatti and Imamganj, the differences in PB votes between winners and runners-up were minimal, highlighting the potential impact of relatively small vote blocs in determining outcomes.
- **Vote Share and Turnout:** Winners' total votes generally ranged from 66,000 to 127,000, with vote shares mostly between 40% and 55%, the highest being 127,650 in Lalganj.
- **Postal Ballot Impact:** While EVM votes overwhelmingly constituted the totals, the postal ballot process showed significant variability. In several ACs, substantial numbers of postal ballots were rejected—for example, Hajipur recorded 855 deleted PBs—indicating inconsistencies in handling and verification that could have influenced close races.

Overall, the data reveals that electoral outcomes were shaped not only by broad vote patterns but also by razor-thin margins and the handling of postal ballots, highlighting the critical role of minor vote adjustments in competitive constituencies.

3.7 Extremely Low-Margin seats with heavy electoral deletions

A constituency-wise forensic examination of the 2025 Bihar Assembly results, juxtaposed with SIR-linked deletions, reveals a striking structural pattern: seats decided by razor-thin margins coincided with unusually high deletions from the electoral rolls. This pattern assumes critical significance given that the deletions occurred prior to polling, directly affecting the size and composition of the electorate rather than voter choice on polling day.

Table 4
Extremely Low Margin Seats with Heavy Deletions

S. No	AC Name	Winner	EVM Votes	PB	Total	%	Margin	Deleted	Loser PB	Diff PB
1	SANDESH	JDU	80072	526	80598	43.99	27	25,062	463	63
2	AGIAON	BJP	69039	373	69412	45.2	95	20,316	425	-52
3	NABINAGAR	JDU	80115	265	80380	42.29	112	24,530	291	-26
4	BALRAMPUR	LJP	80349	110	80459	29.04	389	29,254	72	38
5	BAKHTIARPUR	LJP	88329	191	88520	45.14	981	17,719	166	25
6	TARAIYA	BJP	85401	163	85564	44.21	1329	32,095	165	-2
7	NARKATIA	JDU	104104	346	104450	46.7	1443	23,431	578	-232
8	DUMRAON	JDU	78884	527	79411	40.37	2105	21733	637	-110
9	RAMGARH	BSP	72383	307	72689	37.31	30		321	-14

In constituencies such as Sandesh (margin: 27 votes), Agiaon (95), Nabinagar (112), Balrampur (389) and Ramgarh (30), the margin of victory was infinitesimal when compared to the scale of deletions, which ranged from 17,000 to over 32,000 electors.

Even in seats where the margin crossed 1,000 votes—such as Taraiya, Narkatia and Dumraon—deletions exceeded 20,000 voters, dwarfing the winning margins several times over.

A comparative analysis between alliances further sharpens this anomaly. The NDA won three seats by margins below 150 votes, whereas the MGB won none in this category. Conversely, the MGB secured three seats with margins exceeding 1,500 votes, while the NDA managed only one such seat. Notably, in multiple low-margin constituencies, MGB candidates polled higher total votes than NDA candidates in comparable seats, yet still lost.

Table 4.1
Extremely Low Margin Seats with Heavy Deletions

S. No	AC Name	Winner	EVM Votes	PB	Total	%	Margin	*Deleted	Loser PB	Diff PB
1	DHAKA	RJD	112079	648	112727	45.12	178		351	297
2	FORBESGANJ	INC	119798	316	120114	47.77	221		275	41
3	CHANPATIA	INC	87132	406	87538	40.07	602		222	184
4	JEHANABAD	RJD	85706	696	86402	44.64	793		441	255
5	BODH GAYA	RJD	99717	519	100236	43.38	881		266	253
6	VALMIKINAGAR	INC	107374	356	107730	46.11	1675		284	72
7	MAKHDUMPUR	RJD	74389	380	74769	44.93	1830		404	-24
8	SAHARSA	IIP	114498	538	115036	44.28	2038		376	162

Postal ballot data compounds this imbalance. The NDA lost in postal votes in five constituencies with margins of 52, 26, 2, 232 and 110 votes, while the MGB lost postal ballots in only one seat, and that too by a negligible margin of 24 votes.

Taken together, these figures point to a decisive pre-poll intervention. Where victory margins were measured in tens or hundreds, the deletion of lakhs of electors was outcome-determinative. The data indicates that the contest was structurally tilted before polling began, suggesting that the SIR functioned not as a neutral administrative exercise but as a mechanism that reshaped electoral outcomes by engineering the electorate itself.

3.8 How the Bihar “Miracle” happened – excess of 1,77,673 votes counted

According to ECI Press Note No. [ECI/PN/313/2025](#) dated 30/09/2025, the total electors after completing the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) were approximately 7.42 crores, an odd use of approximation for such a critical number. Just days later, on 06/10/2025, Press Note No. [ECI/PN/316/2025](#) revised this figure to 7,43,55,976 electors by adding 1,63,619 service voters.

The first post-SIR adjustment raises questions about why a “final” roll was altered even before polling began.

Post-polling, Press Note No. [ECI/PN/351/2025](#) dated 11/11/2025 further increased the total electors to 7,45,26,858, a hike of 1,70,882 voters after voting had concluded, again without explanation. In parallel, polling percentages reported by the ECI also shifted, with PN/351/2025 indicating 66.91% and the very next day [PN/352/2025](#) reporting 67.13%, leaving observers to wonder about the rationale behind these sudden upward revisions.

Together, these revelations—excess votes counted, post-SIR voter roll manipulations, addition and deletion of hundreds of thousands of electors without transparent explanation, and razor-thin constituency margins overwhelmingly favouring one party—highlight a systemic irregularity that weakens confidence in the fairness of the Bihar 2025 elections.

Questions remain unanswered by the ECI regarding voter roll revisions, allocation of votes, and the integrity of counting, leaving observers to conclude that the process was vulnerable to manipulation, and that the so-called “Bihar Miracle” was facilitated by structural anomalies and unexplained irregularities.

CHAPTER 4

Nationwide SIR Plan and the "Graveyard for BLOs"

4.1 The Blueprint for India

- Exporting the Bihar Model: The "Bihar Experiment" of sudden revision (SIR) and data flipping is being prepped for nationwide implementation.
- Precedent: The successful deletion of 8.24% of the electorate in Bihar sets a precedent for removing "anti-incumbency" voters nationally.

4.2 Graveyard for BLOs: the deadly deadline⁸

- Human Cost: The immense pressure on Booth Level Officers (BLOs) to certify deletions without verification.

The implementation of the SIR has resulted in an "inhuman workload and coercive pressure" on Booth Level Officers (BLOs), who are primarily school teachers, Anganwadi workers, and local staff. The compressed timeframe—with the enumeration phase running from November 4 to December 11, 2025—required them to conduct rigorous door-to-door verification, fill pre-printed forms, and digitise voter records, often with limited training and insufficient server/app support. This relentless pressure led to a severe human cost.

A complaint filed with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) on November 25, 2025, cited multiple verified news reports from states like Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, and Kerala, documenting a disturbing pattern of BLOs collapsing, suffering cardiac arrests, or dying by suicide due to the stress.

As reported that at least 32 BLOs had lost their lives in 27 days due to stress, heart attacks, or suicide, with one BLO in Uttar Pradesh recording a heart-breaking video before taking his life around December 5, 2025. The tragic death of Shantimoni Ekka, a 48-year-old Anganwadi worker/BLO in West Bengal, reported around November 21, 2025, was attributed to the overwhelming volume of work, tight deadlines, and the difficulty of administering Bengali forms in a predominantly Hindi-speaking area.

- Punitive Measures: BLOs who refused to sign off on arbitrary deletions (specifically during the July 21-25 period) faced punitive action.

The wider context reveals that the implementation of SIR has been accompanied by threats and punitive measures to ensure compliance with the targets for deletion/verification. BLOs across the country have reported threats of suspension, FIRs, and other disciplinary action if they failed to meet the unrealistic deadlines for form submission, verification, and digitisation. This coercion is seen as a mechanism to force BLOs to certify deletions or questionable data without the meticulous, statutory, and time-consuming process of due verification. This system places the BLO in a position where they must either violate administrative procedures by rushing the verification or face severe administrative penalties, effectively making them scapegoats for a flawed, top-down process.

⁸ <https://sabrangindia.in/the-deadly-deadline-i-cant-do-this-anymore-indias-electoral-revision-turns-into-a-graveyard-for-blos-teachers/>

CHAPTER 5

SIR Fear, (D) Voters, and The "Pre-Verdict Dacoity"

5.1 The "Untraceable" Minority & "D" Voters

- Pre-Verdict Dacoity: Analysis reveals that in 128 out of 243 seats, the number of deleted voters is higher than the winning margin.

An examination of the post-SIR electoral rolls indicates that in 128 out of 243 Assembly constituencies, the number of electors deleted during the SIR exercise exceeds the final winning margin. This establishes that the removal of voters—prior to polling—had the potential to decisively alter electoral outcomes, raising the spectre of results being effectively determined before a single vote was cast.

- Targeted Deletions⁹: "Untraceable" and "Shifted" tags were disproportionately applied to [Muslims, Dalits, and Migrant workers](#).
- Ground-level patterns emerging from the SIR process show that labels such as "untraceable," "shifted," or "not found at address" were applied in a disproportionate and discriminatory manner. These tags overwhelmingly affected Muslims, Dalits, migrant labourers, and economically marginalised communities, groups that are structurally more vulnerable to documentation gaps, mobility due to livelihood, and absence during enumeration visits. The mechanical use of these categories converted social vulnerability into a ground for exclusion. For electors unable to satisfy documentary demands under Para 5(b) of the ECI Order dated 24 June 2025, deletion from the rolls was coupled with reporting to the "competent authority" as suspected foreigners, effectively pushing them into the category of doubtful or disputed ('D') voters without any prior judicial determination. This administrative action resulted in automatic suspension of voting rights, notwithstanding the absence of any legislative framework or tribunal mechanism outside Assam.
- Confirmation: The winning margin in these 128 seats is less than the electors removed by SIR, confirming the election was decided before polling.

The fact that in these 128 constituencies the winning margin is smaller than the number of voters removed confirms that SIR-linked deletions were not electorally neutral. The convergence of targeted deletions, pre-poll disenfranchisement, and absence of adjudicatory safeguards demonstrates that the democratic choice of the electorate was materially compromised.

5.2 The Aadhaar Denial & Bureaucratic Barriers

- Document Harassment: The arbitrary demand for 11 specific documents (not prescribed by law) and the illegal refusal of Aadhaar cards violated Section 23(4) of the RP Act. It introduced onerous citizenship-linked documentation requirements—initially prescribing 11 acceptable documents while excluding widely held identifiers such as the Ration Card, Aadhaar Card, and even the ECI's own Elector Photo Identity Card (EPIC). This exclusion was later addressed when the Supreme Court, during the 8 September 2025 [hearing](#), directed that these documents be considered, expressly mandating Aadhaar as the [12th acceptable](#) document.

⁹ <https://www.reporters-collective.in/trc/repeated-attempts-made-to-delete-muslim-voters>

- The duty of the ECI to act as per law¹⁰

The law is - The Representation of the People Act, 1950 [ACT No. 43 OF 1950] (As on the 22nd July, 2025) - SECTION 23 AND SUB SECTION 23 (4) (5)& (6)

4[(4) the electoral registration officer may for the purpose of establishing the identity of any person require that such person may furnish the Aadhaar number given by the unique identification authority of India as per the provisions of the Aadhaar (targeted delivery of financial and other subsidies, benefits and services) act, 2016 (18 of 2016):

Provided that the electoral registration officer may also require the Aadhaar number from persons already included in the electoral roll for the purposes of authentication of entries in electoral roll and to identify registration of name of the same person in the electoral roll of more than one constituency or more than once in the same constituency.

(5) every person whose name is included in the electoral roll may intimate his Aadhaar number to such authority in such form and manner as may be prescribed, on or before a *date to be notified by the central government in the official gazette.

(6) no application for inclusion of name in the electoral roll shall be denied and no entries in the electoral roll shall be deleted for inability of an individual to furnish or intimate Aadhaar number due to such sufficient cause as may be prescribed:

provided that such individual may be allowed to furnish such other alternate documents as may be prescribed.

- Other documents have to be prescribed by the government not by ECI.
- [23. Inclusion of names in electoral rolls. — (1) Any person whose name is not included in the electoral roll of a constituency may apply to the electoral registration officer for the inclusion of his name in that roll.

5.3 The Martyring of Democracy

A historical comparison highlights the stark contrast between India's electoral accountability in 1975 and the 2025 Bihar elections. In 1975, former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was disqualified by the Allahabad High Court for electoral malpractice because of the mere presence of one BLA there., demonstrating the strict enforcement of the RP Act. In contrast, the 2025 Bihar elections involved systematic irregularities across multiple schemes, including unexplained post-SIR voter additions, deletions, excess votes counted, and razor-thin margins disproportionately favouring one party. The scale and structural nature of these 2025 anomalies far exceed the isolated case of 1975, raising serious questions about institutional oversight.

Has therefore the ECI acted in collusion with the ruling alliance, rendering the mandate illegitimate?

¹⁰ <https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1663/1/A1950-43.pdf>

5.4 Discrepancies in Voter and Polling Data

- First Phase (6.11.2025)
Voter Turnout Figures provided by CEO Bihar at the end of Poll was 64.46%
ECI hiked this number (First Phase Voter Turnout) to 64.66%
Further after five days on 11.11.2025 First Phase Voter Turnout Figures were further hiked by 0.42% and made to 65.08%
- Second Phase (11.11.2025)
Initial Voter Turnout Figures further hiked to 68.76% which is 4.30% more than the First Phase initial announcement by CEO
- Overall Voter Turnout of EVM Votes declared on 11.11.2025 66.91%
- Overall Voter Turnout declared on 12.11.2025 67.13%
- Hiked by 0.22%
- After Counting EVM poll percentage 66.98% (reduced by 0.15%)
- Female Voter turnout Declared on 11.11.2025 71.60%
- Male Voter Turnout Declared on 11.11.2025 62.80%
- However, on 12.11.2025, Both Female and Male Voters hiked by 0.18% each and made 71.78 and 60.98% respectively
- EVM Votes polled as declared on 11.11.2025 (extrapolated from 66.91% of 7,45,26,858) = 4,98,65,921
- EVM Votes polled as declared on 12.11.2025 (extrapolated from 67.13% of 7,45,26,858) = 5,00,29,880
- Total electors declared on 11.11.2025 (extrapolated by adding service electors) 7,45,26,858 + 1,63,619 = 7,46,90,477
- Total Electors declared in Statistical Report = 7, 46, 91,135
- All these varying figures having no match and depict, at best the “bungling” and at worst, manipulations on a large scale by the SEO/CEC at every step.
- EVM votes declared as polled in statistical report = 5,00,30,207
- Total Votes including Postal ballots 5,00,30,207 + 2,01,444 = 5,02,31,651
- Total Valid Votes (as per statistical report) 4,92,97,003 + NOTA 9,10,730 + Valid postal votes 1,77,526 = 5,03,85,259

5.5 Discrepancy even in counting and statistical figures

- $5,03,85,259 - 5,02,31,651 = 1,53,608$
- Hike in Phase 1 from 64.46% to 65.08 = 0.62% $(3,75,13,302 \times 0.62) = 2,32,582$
- Hike in Total polls after 11.11.2025 67.13-66.91 = 0.22%
- Hike as on 12.11.2025 = 1,63,959 votes

Initial hike of Votes in Second phase while declaring initial percentage 4.30% even if one takes 40% of this as a “fake” Vote Hike = 7,40,271 votes

As such, therefore the Total Hike through these various means turns out to be $2,32,582 + 1,63,959 + 7,40,271 = 11,36,812$

The discrepancies in voter numbers outlined above, along with the sudden increase in the electorate, have not been factored into the calculation of the reported rise in polling percentages. Instead, even the inflated polling percentage of the first phase has been treated as a routine and natural increase, without any reconciliation with these underlying anomalies.

This whole exercise on figures changed by ECI shows that the ECI has indulged in fudging of figures at each step in such an ugly manner and at such a large scale that one figure does not tally with the other and ECI is working with such immunity that even if right hand does not know what the left has done, the ECI is not bothered.

ECI has set a new record of Refusing to put in the Public Domain the total votes polled and the constituency wise votes polled to date. As such calculations from these figures extrapolated by various projections are that 103 seats have been managed to ensure a Victory for NDA even after all allowances given to NDA.

5.6 Game of very high rejection in postal ballots

• Total Postal Votes	201444
• 6b No of Rejected Postal Votes	23918
• 6c % Of Rejected Postal Votes Over Total Postal Votes	11.87%

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